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INTRODUCTION

Most people would quickly agree with Benjamin Franklin's often
quoted admonition that "in this world nothing can be said to be certain
but death and taxes."' Montana continues to grapple with this disagreeable certainty in the midst of uncertain economic times and shortfalls in
government revenue. Difficult choices have become a necessity.2 The
Montana economy suffered a dramatic downturn during the 1980s, encompassing all of the state's major industries.' Despite such economic difficulties, or perhaps because of them, Montana voters have demanded
property tax relief.' Montana taxpayers have paid among the highest
property taxes in the United States.' The 1986 enactment of an initiative
strictly limiting property tax collections,6 and the closer-than-anticipated
rejection of another that would have abolished property taxes entirely,7
manifested the voters' desire for property tax reform. In addition to this
1.

10 A. SMYTH, WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 69 (1910).

2. See Tax Reform Takes Center Stage at '89 Legislature: Money Greases Wheels of
Montana Government, Missoulian, Dec. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 4. Perhaps the most dramatic
example in recent years occurred in 1986, when an economic downturn caused revenue to
fall short of expenditures. Governor Schwinden called a special session of the legislature to
bring the budget back into balance. Senate Journal Special Session III of the 49th Legislature of the State of Montana, at 2 (1986).
3. B. BEATTIE & D. YOUNG, MONTANA TAXATION AND EXPENDITURES: ISSUES AND OPTIONS
3 (1988). Professors Beattie and Young teach in the departments of Agricultural Economics
and Economics at Montana State University. The study cited here was published as a monograph by the Burton K. Wheeler Center at Montana State University. See also MONT. Bus.
Q., Winter, 1988 at 16 (published by the Bureau of Business and Economic Research at the
University of Montana) (providing a summary of the study).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 94-115.
5. In 1987, Montana ranked tenth in the nation in property tax collections per capita,
and fourth in property tax collections per $1,000 of personal income. CAL. TAXPAYERS' Ass'N,
State and Local Tax Collections-1987, CAL-TAx NEWS, Jan. 15, 1989, at 4 [hereinafter
CAL-TAx NEWS]. In 1986, Montana levied the ninth highest property taxes of the fifty
states, including both state and local taxes. BEATIE & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 37. See also
REVENUE AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, COMPARING INDIVIDUAL TAX BURDENS IN THE FIFTY
STATES, 46th Montana Legislature, table I, at 4 (1978) [hereinafter COMPARING TAX BURDENS]. The committee reached this conclusion by comparing property taxes levied per
$1,000 of personal income. The committee noted that such a comparison may be suspect;
property taxes by their very nature "do not correlate with income." Id. at 3. Even so, disproportionately high taxes in comparison to income strongly suggest that taxes may consume

an inordinately large portion of individual income.
6. Initiative 105 limited property taxes to 1986 levels, but gave the legislature the option of instituting full scale property tax reform. Initiative 105, §§ 2, 3 reprinted in SECRETARY OF STATE, 1986 MONTANA VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET at 23 [hereinafter 1986 VOTER
PAMPHLET]. The voters passed Initiative 105 by a 10% margin. SECRETARY OF STATE, 1986
OFFICIAL CANVASS [hereinafter 1986 CANVASS].
7.

Constitutional Initiative 27 would have enacted a constitutional prohibition of all

real and personal property taxes. Constitutional Initiative 27, § 2, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET,
supra note 6, at 16. The voters rejected that initiative by a vote of 56% against to 44% in
favor. 1986 CANVASS, supra note 6.
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apparent voter dissatisfaction, the Montana Supreme Court recently invalidated the state's school funding system.8 These circumstances necessitate a serious consideration of property tax reform.
As this article goes to press, the Legislature and Governor Stephens
prepare for a special session to consider reforms to Montana's revenue
structure.9 This article presents an argument for comprehensive revision
of Montana's property tax system, with emphasis on protecting the interests of taxpayers. This article does not proceed, however, from a perception that Montana's overall tax burden is excessive. 0 Nor does it take a
position on the ongoing sales tax controversy. To the extent that government may seek to increase revenue in other ways to compensate for the
loss of property tax revenue, policies should assure that property tax reform is not circumvented through overly broad authorizations for new
revenue. The fundamental thesis of this analysis is that tax reform can
succeed only if undertaken in full consideration of the pitfalls which can
frustrate reform. This article therefore directs the attention of policy
makers to California's successes and failures in attempting property tax
reform. Simply lowering tax rates will not suffice to guarantee the success
of tax reform. Policy makers must also consider the amount of revenue
the government should collect, the revenue sources to prefer, and the
avoidance of possible circumventions of limitations on the property tax.
This article begins by presenting the fundamentals of Montana's
property tax system and its current need for reform. It then explores the
results of California's attempts at property tax reform. This article concludes with suggestions for Montana policy makers in dealing with the
pitfalls that may arise in reforming the property tax system and in making their policy choices effective.
8. Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, Mont. -, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
9. Governor's Call to Convene the Montana Legislature into Special Session, May 18,
1989 [hereinafter Governor's Call] (the Governor's Call will be reprinted in the journals of
each house following the special session). This article addresses five of the seven specific
revenue issues to which the Governor limited the special session. Those seven issues include
the following: equalizing school funding; academic and fiscal accountability; reducing and
reforming income and property taxes; constitutional amendments to limit the growth of
state spending and limit increases in statewide sales taxes; sources to replace property taxes
in school funding; appropriation and authorization of school funding; and state taxation of
pensions.
10. Montana ranks twentieth among the fifty states in state and local revenues per
capita, and twenty-ninth in total taxes paid per capita. However, Montana ranks higher in
terms of state revenue as a percentage of personal income. BEATTIE & YOUNG, supra note 3,
at 37. Montana's lofty ranking when revenue is compared to personal income probably results from Montana's abundance of natural resources, "which adds more to our tax capacity
than to personal income." Id. at 16. Even the conclusion that Montana collects a large
amount of tax in comparison to personal income may be challenged by another study, which
indicates that Montana ranks only twenty-second. CAL-TAx NEWS, supra note 5, at 5 (citing
statistics compiled by the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census). However, Montana's tax burdens still tend to be greater than that of all of its neighboring states, except
BEATTIE
YOUNG, supra
note 3, at 1989
11.
Published byWyoming.
ScholarWorks
at&University
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MONTANA'S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM

A. Background
The property tax has been called "Montana's main revenue
source."'" Montana has historically relied more heavily upon the property
tax than upon any other source of revenue. In recent years, property tax
collections have totaled well over $500 million dollars per year," while the
next largest revenue source, the income tax, has generated around $230
million."3
The property tax ranks as one of the most ancient forms of taxation.
One authority has traced its lineage as far back as the records of the Old
Testament, which indicate that the Pharaohs levied a form of property
tax. "' The Romans also levied a property tax, as did the rulers of England
both before and after the Norman Conquest.' 5 One of the first acts of
William the Conqueror upon ascending the English throne was to order a
survey of his lands for the purpose of property assessment.' Even "[t]he
legendary battles of Robin Hood with the Sheriff of Nottingham were
more over the collection of taxes than the administration of justice."' 7
In Montana, the first Territorial Legislature enacted the state's earliest property tax in 1864."8 Substantial resistance to that first tax can be
inferred from the fact that tax collectors received less than thirty percent
of the tax due. Many counties levied the tax only at a far lower rate than
that set by the Legislature. Three counties, Beaverhead, Chouteau, and
Meagher, did not even levy a property tax.' 9
Montana's 1889 constitution contained particularly rigid provisions
dealing with property taxes. 0 Like most state constitutions enacted in
that period, its stringent limits more resembled a legislative code than a
set of fundamental guiding principles.2 For example, the rigidity of this
11. Argument Against ConstitutionalInitiative 27, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note
6, at 7. Authors of that argument included state representatives Gene Donaldson and J.
Melvin Williams, University of Montana Professor Thomas Payne, and Ardi Aiken and Eric
Feaver. Id.
12. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 1986-88 BIENNIAL REPORT 135 (1988) [hereinafter BIENNIAL REPORT].
13. Id. at 4, 5.
14. 1 K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY § 1:02 (3d ed. 1988).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. SUBCOMMITTEE ON TAXATION, MONTANA'S PROPERTY TAXES: ASSESSMENT AND CLASSIFICATION, 45th Montana Legislature, at 7 (1976).
19. Id. These collection problems continued for some time, despite efforts by the territorial legislature to encourage compliance. Id.
20. Comment, Revenue and Taxation in the Montana Constitution: Present and Proposed, 33 MONT. L. REV. 126, 126 (1973) (authored by P. Bruce Harper) [hereinafter Revenue and Taxation].
21. WE THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA ....5-6 (J. Lopach ed. 1983) [hereinafter WE THE
PEOPLE]. This treatise includes contributions by Professors James J. Lopach, Thomas
Payne, Ellis Waldron, and Margery H. Brown of the University of Montana, and Professors
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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document prevented the legislature from dealing effectively with the
problems of property owners who lost their land during the Depression
due to delinquent taxes."2 A large body of case law developed to define
the strict limits within which the legislature could act in setting tax
policy. 3
Montana adopted a new constitution in 1972 to replace the outdated
and restrictive original. "4 With regard to property taxes, the constitution
now provides simply, "The state shall appraise, assess, and equalize the
valuation of all property which is to be taxed in the manner provided by
law." 5 The constitution therefore leaves a virtually blank slate on which
to chart the state's property tax policy.
B.

Calculation of Property Taxes

The current property tax system operates on a three-step basis.
These three steps are assessment, computation of taxable value, and application of the mill levy to arrive at the amount of tax due." An understanding of each step is essential to any meaningful attempt at reform.
1. Property Tax Assessment
The Department of Revenue carries out the first step in the process
by assessing all taxable property at 100% of its market value. 7 State law
defines market value as "the value at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller .
,," County assessors bear
the responsibility for locating all taxable property and providing the Department of Revenue with all the information required for assessment. 9
Implicit in the market value concept is the policy of basing assessments on the highest and best use to which the land might be put, rather
than on the actual present use. The price a willing buyer will readily pay
depends more on what he or she could do with the property than with the
current use.2 The legislature created an exception to this principle by
enacting statutes mandating that assessments of agricultural land be
Lauren S. McKinsey and Jerry W. Calvert of Montana State University.
22. See generally, State ex rel Kain v. Fischl, 94 Mont. 92, 98-99, 20 P.2d 1057, 1060
(1933).
23. Revenue and Taxation, supra note 20, at 128-34.
24. See, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 21, at 6-12 for a discussion of the causes and
circumstances of the replacement of the 1889 constitution.
25. MONT. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (emphasis added).
26. Procedures for levy of the property tax are set forth in Title 15 of the Montana
Code Annotated (1987). Additional procedures relative to counties and municipalities are
contained in Title 7, Chapter 6, parts 25 and 44 of the Montana Code Annotated (1987).
27. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-8-111 (1987).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-8-111(2)(a) (1987).
29. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-8-102(1) (1987).
30. See Goetz, Recent Developments in Montana Land Use Law, 38 MONT. L. REV. 97,
122 (1977).
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based solely on its value for agriculture."' This addresses the problem of
owners of agricultural land whose property lies in the path of potential
development but who wish to forgo the lure of development dollars to
continue farming or ranching. Property taxes thereby become a neutral
factor in the decision to sell to a developer.3 2
2. Calculation of Taxable Value
The second step consists of calculating the taxable value by multiplying the assessed value by the tax rate applicable to a particular classification of property.3 3 The legislature has enacted differing rates of taxation
for property, depending upon its character and use. Montana statutes divide property into twenty classifications, each with its own tax rate.3 4
Taking as an example a residential property with an assessed value of
31. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-7-201 to -213 (1987). The Montana Code Annotated currently includes two statutes numbered as § 15-7-201. One applies to the 1986 land valuation
schedules, and terminates January 1, 1991. The other applies to the 1991 land valuation
schedules. This system effectuates a transition to taxing agricultural land based upon its
productive capacity, as mandated by MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-6-133 (1987). See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 15-7-201(3), (4) (1987) (second statute).
32. Goetz, supra note 30, at 124.
33. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-1-101(1)(P)(1987).
34. Montana's current property classifications include the following:
Class. No.
1
2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Brief Description

Tax Rate

Net proceeds of mines, except coal or metal
Net proceeds of coal and metal mines
Agricultural land
Most residential and commercial real estate
Some cooperative rural electric and telephone
equipment, pollution control devices, new industrial
property, research equipment, electrolytic reduction
facitlites
Livestock and agricultural products
Some cooperative rural electric and telephone
equipment, electric and gas utility equipment, some
tools
Agricultural and mining equipment, some equipment
and trucks
Commercial personalty not in other classes
Radio and TV equipment, coal and ore haulers, theatre
projectors and sound equipment
Most utilities
Trailers and mobile homes used as a residence
Timberland
Improvements to agricultural property

100%
3 to 45%
Variable
3.86%
3%

Railroad transportation property
Harness, saddlery, and tack equipment
Airline transportation property
Nonproductive patented mining claims
Non productive small real estate parcels
Some agricultural and timber processing equipment

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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8%
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13%
16%
12%
3.86%
Variable
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four rate
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11%
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30%
2%
3.86%
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$100,000, and applying the applicable tax rate of 3.86%, 35 yields a taxable
value of $3,860.
3. Mill Levies and Calculation of Tax Due
The final step is to calculate the tax due by applying the mill levy for
a particular year. A "mill" is one tenth of one cent, 6 and is generally
expressed in terms of mills per dollar of taxable valuation. 17 Both state
and local governments impose mill levies, and a multitude of separate
levies combine to produce the ultimate tax liability on a particular property. State law contains many provisions for individual levies, and those
statutes usually include an upper limit on the number of mills the taxing
entity may levy for a particular purpose. The amount of tax due equals
the taxable value of property multiplied by the mill levy."
a. Statewide Levies
The eventual tax bill includes a variety of levies. For example, under
state law the legislature must impose a mill levy sufficient to raise "the
amount necessary to meet the appropriations made for the 2 succeeding
fiscal years and for the payment of deficiencies if any have occurred in
the previous fiscal year or fiscal years. ' 39 That levy may not exceed "2 1/2
mills on each dollar of valuation."40 In addition, under a measure enacted
by Montana voters,1 the Montana University System garners the revenues
4
of a six mill levy.

The property tax provides only a minor portion of the revenue generated at the state level. 2 Other governmental entities levy additional
property taxes. What follows is not a comprehensive list of all possible
mill levies and their limits, but rather a representative sample to provide
a picture of overall property tax levies.
b. Elementary and Secondary Education Funding
School funding is perhaps the most complicated area of property tax
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-6-131 to -150 (1987).
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-6-134 (1987).
36. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 48.

See also BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY

896 (5th

ed. 1979).
37. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-2502 (1987).
38. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 48. An example of this calculation is set out in
the text accompanying notes 72-74, infra.
39. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-101 (1987).
40. Id.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-105 (1987) (temporary statute). Montana voters have
consistently imposed this levy every decade since 1914, although for varying numbers of
years. E. WALDRON & P. WILSON, ATLAS OF MONTANA ELECTIONS, 1889-1976 240 (1978). The
voters most recently reenacted the 6 mill levy through Legislative Referendum 106 in November, 1988. SECRETARY OF STATE, 1988 OFFICIAL CANVASS.
42. For example, in 1978 the state received only 1.3 % of its total revenue from the
property tax. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 21 at 205.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1989

7

Montana Law Review, Vol. 50 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 4

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

finance and a challenging area for tax reform. Historically, Montana
schools have relied largely on local property tax revenue. In 1988, 56.8%
of all property taxes levied in Montana went to public schools."3 Counties
raised much of this money locally through statutory,'4 permissive," and
voted46 levies. The state's school foundation program raised additional
property tax revenue and distributed it statewide to districts based upon
need.47
The Montana Supreme Court recently struck down the state's system
of school funding as a violation of the right to equal educational opportunity guaranteed by the Montana Constitution. This decision rested on
extensive findings of fact as to "disparities of spending per pupil as high
as 8 to 1 in comparisons between similarly-sized school districts. 4' The
differences result from disparities in the total taxable value of property
from one school district to another. This resulted in differing amounts of
revenue even when the districts levy the same number of mills.50 The evidence demonstrated major differences based on the wealth of school districts, unrelated to any educationally pertinent factors." The court concluded that Montana's "excessive reliance on permissive and voted
levies" has denied students the right to equal educational opportunity.5 2
During its 1989 regular session, the Legislature failed to reach a consensus on how to respond to the constitutional requirement of equal education funding. Disagreement centered on whether reform of the education finance system should rely on increased statewide property taxes or
on a sales tax. 3 At the time of this writing, a special session of the Legislature is prepared to convene to restructure Montana's system of education finance.54
c. Local Government Finance
Local governments also levy property taxes each year in an amount
calculated to meet the spending the government entity plans for the year.
Basic county general fund mill levies may run as high as 27 mills annually.5 5 Counties also impose various other levies of up to 6 mills for sup43.

BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 134.
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-142 (1987).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-352 (1987).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-353 (1987).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-9-301 to -344 (1987).
48. Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, Mont ...
769 P.2d 684,
690; see infra text accompanying notes 219-29 (discussing the implications of this decision).
49. Id. at -, 769 P.2d at 686.
50. Id.
51. Id. at -, 769 P.2d at 690.
52. Id.
53. Legislature Calls it Quits with Tough Issues Hanging, Missoulian, April 22, 1989,
at 1, col. 1.
54. Governor's Call, supra note 9.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-2501 (1987). The limit is 25 mills on property in classes
one, two, and three. Id.
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port of district courts, 6 as much as 10 mills for county-run nursing homes
and hospitals,57 and various special services." Alternatively, counties may
replace most, but not all, of its individual levies with a single all-purpose
levy, which may reach a maximum of 55 mills 59 Counties may exceed any
of these limits by a majority vote of the local electors.6
Municipalities may also levy taxes on property." The levy for general
municipal or administrative purposes may not exceed 24 mills.62 Like
counties, municipalities may impose additional levies for certain special
purposes, such as transportation for senior citizens and the handicapped, 3 and construction and operation of airports. 4 As an alternative
to imposing the general fund levy and a plethora of special purpose levies,
municipalities, like counties, may instead impose an all-purpose levy, limited to 65 mills.6 5 Even then, however, municipalities may impose additional levies for bonded indebtedness, judgments, tax protest refunds, or
for special improvement district revolving funds.6 6 Municipalities may
also exceed mill levy limits by majority vote of the local electors.6 7
The Montana Constitution allows additional local policy-making discretion to local governments with self-government charters.66 The adoption of self-government charters allows localities to exercise all powers not
forbidden by the constitution, state statute, or the charter itself.69 Selfgoverning localities are not subject to the mill levy limits set by state
law. 70 Such local governments are not restricted to revenue sources specifically authorized by state law, but may impose any tax except a local income tax or sales tax.7 '
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-2511 (1987).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-2512 (1987).
58. These include a bridge levy, MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-14-2502 (1987), recreation levy,
MoNr. CODE ANN. § 7-16-101 (1987), county fair levy, MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-21-3410 (1987),
weed levy, MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-22-2142 (1987), insect pest levy, MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-222306 (1987), poor fund levy, MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-2-321 (1987), and developmental disabilities facility levy, MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-20-208 (1987).
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-2522 (1987). More precisely, the limit is the lesser of 55
mills or the total number of mills levied in the previous year under the general fund levy
and special services levies. Id.
60. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-2531(2) (1987).
61. MONT CODE ANN. § 7-6-4401 (1987). Municipalities include cities and towns. Id.
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-4405 (1987). The statute actually expresses this limit as
2.4% of taxable value. This percentage has been converted into mills for the sake of
consistency.
63. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-14-111 (1987).
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 67-10-402 (1987).
65. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-4452 (1987).
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-4453 (1987).
67. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-6-4431 (1987).
68. MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
69. Id. See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-101 (1987).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-114(1)(g) (1987).
71. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-112(1) (1987). Resort communities may impose sales taxes
under limited circumstances. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6-4461 to -4467 (1987).
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d. Calculationof Tax Due
The actual tax liability on a particular piece of property will depend
upon whether the property is located inside a municipality, whether the
property lies within other taxing jurisdictions, whether the various taxing
entities levy their maximum tax, whether local governments elect to impose all-purpose levies, whether the local voters authorize an override of
the limits, and on the amount levied for schools. It is therefore not possible to calculate the ultimate tax liability on a given piece of property
without knowing the particular levies applicable at its location.
An example may illustrate the calculation of the final property tax.
Property located within the City of Missoula in the 1988 tax year was
subject to the following levies: 129.76 mills for the City of Missoula, 72.78
mills for Missoula County, 18.00 mills for the state, 92.49 mills for Missoula School District # 1 (elementary), 59.89 mills for the Missoula
County High School District, 80.70 mills for county-wide school levies,
and 9.82 mills for urban transportation.7" These levies total 463.44 mills.
In our earlier example of a house with an assessed valuation of $100,000,
the taxable value was calculated at $3,860.00. 73 Because one mill equals

one tenth of one cent for each dollar of taxable value, application of mill
levies totaling 463.44 mills results in a tax due of $1,788.88."'
C. The Need for Reform
1. Montana's Property Tax Problem
In 1986, Montana voters passed Initiative 105,"s clearly expressing
their desire for property tax reform. That initiative froze property taxes
at their 1986 levels, but invited the legislature to consider full scale property tax reform." This demand for reform becomes all the more apparent
when viewed in light of the fact that over four voters in ten favored Constitutional Initiative 27, which would have abolished property taxes
77
entirely.
Specific grievances against Montana's property tax system include
72. Letter from Mr. James Fairbanks, Missoula County Assessor, to the author (Feb.
17, 1989) (confirming a letter from the author to Mr. Fairbanks dated Feb. 15, 1989). This
document sets forth the mill levies, based on information provided by Mr. Fairbanks in a
telephone interview on January 27, 1989, and Mr. Fairbanks' confirmation of the figures. It
is currently on file in the offices of the Montana Law Review. These figures reflect the Assessor's compilation of individual levies by each taxing authority in the jurisdiction. The
author wishes to thank Mr. Fairbanks for his courtesy in providing this information.
73. See supra text accompanying note 35.
74. Because a mill is one-tenth of a cent per dollar of taxable value, 463.44 mills
equals $0.46344 per dollar of taxable value. Multiplying that figure by $3,860, our hypothetical taxable value results in $1,788.88 tax due.
75. 1986 CANVASS, supra note 6.
76. Initiative 105, § 1, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 23. See also infra text
accompanying notes 94-115.
77. 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 16 § 2. The voters rejected Constitutional
Initiative 27 by a margin of 56% against to 44% in favor. 1986 CANVASS, supra note 6.
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complaints of the high cost of home ownership, the harm to Montana's
competitive position in attracting business, and the considerable burden
of administration.7 8 Objections to the property tax also stem from the relation, or lack thereof, between property values and the ability to pay
taxes. As economists Beatty and Young argued, "[W]ealth as measured
by the market value of real or personal property or units of natural resources extracted is fraught with difficulties as a good measure of, or even
minimally acceptable proxy for, ability to pay."'79 This problem is particularly acute in Montana.
Montana's property taxes are among the highest in the nation. In
1987, Montana's property taxes were the fourth highest in the nation
when calculated as a percentage of per capita income, and the tenth highest per capita.s The property tax accounts for 19.9% of Montana's state
and local revenue, on a per capita basis from all sources, compared to a
national average of 14.3% .1' A 1978 legislative study indicated that only
five states collect more property taxes per $1,000 of personal income than
Montana."2 A different authority concluded that in 1979 Montana ranked
fourth in property tax as a share of personal income, and eighth in property tax per capita." Another analysis concluded that in 1986 Montana
ranked ninth in the nation in property taxes paid per capita. 4 The precise ranking may vary depending upon the criteria used for measurement,
and on the year in which the data was collected. The conclusion remains
inescapable, however, that Montana's property tax burden is out of line
with that imposed by other states.
This heavy reliance on the property tax becomes most apparent at
the local level. Following a consistent pattern dating back to statehood, 5
Montana law restricts local governments primarily to the property tax as
a revenue source." An analysis of property tax expenditures illustrates
this reliance. In the 1986-88 biennium, 56.8% of property tax revenue
went to elementary and secondary education. 7 Counties received the second highest share, with 20.7% of property tax collections.8 8 Cities and
78. BEATTIE & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 3-4.
79. Id. at 7.
80. CAL-TAx NEws, supra, note 5, at 4 (citing statistics compiled by the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census).
81. See BEATIE & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 14.
82. COMPARING TAX BURDENS, supra note 5, at 4.
83. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 21, at 234.
84. BEATTIE & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 37.
85. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 21 at 234-35.
86. Parts 25 and 44 of Title 7 of the Montana Code Annotated authorize property tax
collections by counties and municipalities respectively. Provisions authorizing other taxes
are virtually non-existent, except as to local governments with self-government charters.
Those localities may levy any tax except for a local income tax or sales tax. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 7-1-112(1) (1987).
87. BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 134.
88. Id.
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towns received 13.8% of revenue, and fire districts gathered 6.5%. 81 The
state, including levies for the university system and for livestock, received
only 2.2%.90
As local governmental spending has increased, and federal revenue
sharing has decreased, local authorities unable to raise revenue from alternative sources placed a greater burden on the property taxpayer. 9' In
1975 property taxes accounted for approximately ninety-five percent of
local government's tax revenue.2 Not only does this state of affairs place
a tremendous burden on the property taxpayer, it also denies local governments the flexibility to tailor their revenue collection to the conditions
of their particular localities. 3
2. Initiative 105: The Voters' Call for Reform
When Montana voters passed Initiative 105, they declared as a matter of policy that "Montana's reliance on the taxation of property to support education and local government has placed an unreasonable burden"
on property owners."' Initiative 105 also decried the lack of local flexibility in developing sources of revenue, and expressed the fear that ignoring
calls for reform "will only lead to increases in the tax burden on the already overburdened property taxpayer." 95 The voters expressly called
upon the legislature to reform the property tax system by developing "(a)
a tax system that is fair to property taxpayers; and (b) a method of providing adequate funding for local government and education."" Initiative
105 represented the efforts of Montanans of moderate political temperament to gain control over what they regarded as excessive property taxation. Contrasted with its more severe companion on the November, 1986
ballot, Constitutional Initiative 27, Initiative 105 sought to reform property taxes, not abolish them.7
89.

Id. The figure for cities and towns includes 5.4% for special improvement districts.

Id.
90. Id.
91. Local FiscalImpact of the Loss of General Revenue Sharing: HearingsBefore the
Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency, Federalism, and the District of Columbia of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 50 (1987) (testimony of Comptroller General of the United States Charles A. Bowsher). See also WE THE
PEOPLE, supra note 21, at 234.
92. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 21, at 234.
93. Id. at 236. The Montana Constitution embodies a policy of allowing communities
to tailor their local governments to local desires and conditions. Id. at 215; MONT. CONST.
art. XI. Though proper in any state, this policy seems particularly appropriate in a state
such as Montana with its significant social, economic, and geographic differences. The Montana Constitution provides localities with the option of choosing among alternate forms of
government, MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 3, and allows for self-government charters to increase
local autonomy, MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-401(1) (1987). This statute codifies section one of Initiative 105. See Initiative 105, § 1, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 23.
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-401(2) (1987).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-401(3) (1987).
97. Ballot Argument For Initiative 105, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 14.
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The drafters of Initiative 105 chose the legislature over the initiative
process as the appropriate forum for considering "difficult and complex
decisions" of tax reform,"8 and included a major incentive for the legislature to enact reforms. The initiative freezes property taxes at 1986 levels
for agricultural land, most residential and commercial property, livestock
and agricultural products, various commercial personalty, mobile homes,
and improvements on agricultural land." New construction and improvements are taxed at 1986 levels. 00 The initiative further provides that this
halt in property tax increases "does not apply to levies for rural improvement districts ....

special improvement districts ...

,

or bonded indebt-

edness."'' This limitation to 1986 levels means a freeze of "the actual
dollar amount of taxes imposed on an individual piece of property ...
.9102 Therefore if assessed values rise due to an increase in market value,
or if tax rates or mill levies change, the actual number of tax dollars due
against a particular piece of property cannot increase.
This rigid limitation indicates that its drafters never intended Initiative 105 to become a permanent tax reform measure. Even the most ardent advocates of property tax limitation acknowledge that increases in
the cost of living apply to governments as well as to citizens.' It appears
that the drafters of the initiative intended that the erosion of revenues
through inflation should induce the legislature to take action of its own.
The proponents of the measure argued that it would "force[] the Legislature to face the reality of an unbalanced tax system that fails to produce
adequate revenues to fund government.9'
Initiative 105 articulated its call for thorough property tax reform in
an uncodified provision. Section 3 of the initiative declares that the propConstitutional Initiative 27 would have amended the state constitution to forbid property
taxes entirely. Id. at 16. The voters enacted Initiative 105 while rejecting Constitutional
Initiative 27. 1986 CANVASS, supra note 6.
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-401(3) (1987). Authorities have often criticized the
Montana legislature for its shameful history of corruption and servile obedience to powerful
economic interests. See, e.g., K. TOOLE, TWENTIETH CENTURY MONTANA: A STATE OF ExTREMES 259-60 (1972). Some have argued that this history makes the legislature unsuitable
for resolving important problems. State ex rel. Montana Citizens for the Preservation of
Citizens' Rights v. Waltermire, Mont. dissenting). See also Harper v. Greely, -

-, 729 P.2d 1283, 1296 (1986) (Sheehy, J.,
Mont. -,
-,
763 P.2d 650, 657 (1988)

(Sheehy, J., dissenting). However, Professor Lopach argues compellingly that this background should not color the perception of the legislature under the 1972 constitution.
Lopach, The Montana Supreme Court in Politics,48 MONT. L. REV. 267, 268-70 (1987). The

balance of governmental powers necessary for a well-functioning political system necessitates a proper respect for the legislature in its reformed condition. Id. at 270.
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-402(1) (1987). This statute codifies § 2 of Initiative 105.
See Initiative 105, § 2, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 23.
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-402(3) (1987).
101.
102.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 15-10-402(4) (1987).

15-10-402(2) (1987).

103. California's Proposition 13, the archetype of tax-limitation measures, allows increases in the assessed value of property when transferred or newly constructed, CAL. CONST.
art. XIIIA, § 2(a), or in a limited way for inflation, CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(b).
104. Ballot Argument for Initiative 105, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 14.
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erty tax freeze would not go into effect if, prior to July 1, 1987, the legislature were to enact legislation that:
(a) states that it is being enacted in response to this initiative;
(b) reduces property tax on a statewide basis on property [in certain
classes]; and
(c) establishes alternative revenue sources to replace revenue lost to local
governments, school districts, the university system, and other property
taxing jurisdictions as a result of the reduced property taxes.'
The legislature enacted no such legislation during its 1987 session.
Instead it simply enacted two provisions to implement, and slightly
amend,'06 the property tax freeze. While Initiative 105 halted tax increase
only on certain classes of property, the legislature extended that freeze to
all classes.10 7 The implementing act also specified that the actual dollar
amount of taxes due may increase where property is subdivided, annexed
into a new taxing unit, transferred to a new taxing unit, reclassified, or
newly constructed. '
The legislature also provided that a taxpayer's tax liability may exceed 1986 levels if the total taxable valuation of all property within a
taxing jurisdiction decreases by five percent or more from the previous
tax year.'0 9 If the aggregate taxable value decreases by five percent or
105. Initiative 105, § 3, 1986 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 23.
106. In 1920, the Montana Supreme Court held that the legislature has the authority
to amend voter enacted initiatives, reasoning that the constitutional amendment creating
the initiative power did not restrict the people's delegation of legislative powers to their
elected representatives. State ex rel. Goodman v. Stewart, 57 Mont. 144, 150-51, 187 P. 641,
643 (1920). The Attorney General has concluded that the 1972 Constitution did not alter
this rule. 42 Op. Mont. Att'y Gen. 21 at 5 (1987).
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-412(1) (1987). As originally enacted, this statute was to
terminate on December 31, 1989. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-412 (1987). The 1989 Legislature enacted a measure to make this statute permanent. S.B. 65, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess.,
§ 1 (1989). As of this writing, the bill awaited the signature of Governor Stephens.
108. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-412(3) (1987). Attorney General Greely determined
that Initiative 105 does not limit the taxes levied by a new taxing entity created after 1986.
42 Op. Mont. Att'y Gen. 80 (1988). This opinion could be challenged where evasion of the
tax freeze motivated formation of the taxing unit. See Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n
v. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 213, 643 P.2d 941, 950, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324, 333 (1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting). A similar challenge to a tax under California's Proposition 13 recently
succeeded at the trial court level. Rider v. County of San Diego, No. 194690 (Riverside
County Superior Court) (March 21, 1989). An appeal to California's Fourth District Court of
Appeal is anticipated following the resolution of an unrelated motion before the trial court.
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-412(7) (1987). A bill passed by the 1989 Legislature
substituted "1986" for "previous" in subsection 7. S.B. 65, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1.
This amendment allows mill levies to increase where property values have fallen five percent
or more relative to the 1986 tax year, rather than relative to the immediately preceding
year. Id. It also has the effect of negating the opinion of the Attorney General that taxing
entities could avail themselves of MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-412 (7) for more than one year
at a time only where property values continued to fall by five percent or more each year. See
42 Op. Mont. Att'y Gen. 21 (1987). This result follows because taxing entities may impose
increased property taxes where values are five percent below the 1986 level, rather than only
if five percent below the previous year's level. S.B. 65, § 1. At the time of this writing, this
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more, the taxing entity may raise the mill levy by an amount calculated
to raise the same number of dollars as the 1986 levy.11 ° This might result
in an increased dollar amount of tax on a particular piece of property if
that property has not itself decreased in value by five percent, because
taxing entities must impose an equal number of mills against all property
within the jurisdiction."' In addition, the legislature allowed for increases
in the amount of taxes upon voter approval."1
Initiative 105 amounted to a call for reform, rather than an enactment of reform. The state government should address property tax reform in a carefully planned response to Initiative 105. The 1987 Legislature, however, simply propped up a series of temporary measures and
evaded the real question of tax reform."' The legislature deadlocked during its 1989 regular session, adjourning without enacting any significant
property tax reform. 14 This article goes to press as the governor and legislators plan a special session for June of 1989 to consider school funding
issues and potentially sweeping reforms of the state's revenue structure."' Hopefully, the legislative resolve to comprehensively address this
difficult issue will still emerge.
Tax reform means more than a simple freeze. It means a careful balancing of alternative sources of revenue. It means setting priorities between public sector and private sector needs amid tough economic circumstances. The time has come for the legislature to address this
problem in a thorough way.
III.

CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH PROPERTY TAX REFORM

California's experience with property tax reform provides useful
guidance to other states seeking to provide relief to overburdened propbill awaited the signature of Governor Stephens.
110.

MONT. CODE ANN. §

15-10-412(7) (1987).

111. The statute simply limits the levy to the "number [of mills] calculated to equal
the revenue from property taxes for the 1986 tax year in that taxing unit." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 15-10-412(7) (1987). The Attorney General has concluded that levies must impose a uniform number of mills on all property within a jurisdiction. 42 Op. Mont. Att'y Gen. 129
(1988).
112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-10-412(9) (1987).
113. See BEATT1E & YOUNG, supra note 3 at 38. Beattie and Young note a similar
failure to come to terms with the economic situation confronting the state. "The [Montana]
Legislature has responded with a series of temporary solutions, including salary freezes,
across-the-board expenditure cuts, a surtax on the income tax, and spending from trust
funds. These actions clearly do not represent a long-run solution." Id.
114. Special Session Looms, Missoulian, April 18, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Bills introduced
but not adopted included proposals to reduce or limit property taxes, S.B. 158, 51st Mont.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989), S.B. 451, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989), H.B. 475, 51st Mont.
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989), or to amend Initiative 105 in various ways to permit property tax
increases. S.B. 2, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989); H.B. 125, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1989). Several bills proposed the adoption of a sales tax. H.B. 747, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1989); S.B. 456, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989); S.B. 469, 51st. Mont. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1989).
Governor's Call, supra note 9.
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erty taxpayers. It supplies an example of one way in which the people of a
state have sought reform and of lessons learned as government has reacted to reform. What evolved in California demonstrates that policy
makers should consider not only tax cuts, but the overall design of an
equitable revenue system. Without such planning, revenue devices may
emerge based more on opportunity than policy.
This section begins with a discussion of Proposition 13, an initiative
amendment to the California Constitution. It then considers the legislative response to that initiative and the loss of local control over local government decision-making that resulted. Finally, the section reviews the
court decisions that have ultimately shaped the implementation of Proposition 13.
A.

Proposition 13

California's Proposition 13 stands out as the archetype of tax limitation measures nationwide." 6 Its successes and failures therefore provide

vital lessons for any state considering property tax reform. An examination of the California experience can shed light on Montana's property
tax reform efforts.
The context of the passage of Proposition 13 illuminates the motives
behind its adoption and the terms of its specific provisions. Prior to Proposition 13, California imposed among the highest levels of taxation of
any state. 117 Motivations for the tax reduction movement in California
included not only the desire to control high tax rates, but also the desire
to protect home owners from the tax effects of skyrocketing real estate
values. As inflation and population growth forced real estate values
higher, property tax assessments," 8 and the resulting tax levies, increased
116.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, EXTENSION, PROPOSITION

13,

TEN YEARS LATER:

FINANCES, LOCAL CONTROL, AND THE COMMON GOOD at 1 (1988) [hereinafter PROPOSITION 13,
TEN YEARS LATER] (remarks of Theodore L. Hullar, Chancellor, University of California,

Davis). This publication summarizes the proceedings of a Public Issues Forum presented by
the University Extension of the University of California, Davis, June 24, 1988, held at Sacramento, California.
117. CALIFORNIA TAX FOUNDATION, UP TO THE LIMIT. ARTICLE XIIIB SEVEN YEARS
LATER at 3 (1987) [hereinafter UP TO THE LIMIT]. Specifically, California state and local
revenues ranked second highest in the nation when measured on a per capita basis and third
highest based on revenue per $1,000 of personal income. Id. Another survey ranked California fourth highest in the nation in overall tax burden. COMPARING TAX BURDENS, supra note
5, at 4-5.
In the year before the adoption of Proposition 13, California's overall tax burden, from
all tax sources, was 27% above the national average. Comment, Police and Fire Service
Special Assessments Under Proposition 13, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 781, 783 n.17 (1982) [hereinafter Special Assessments] (citing SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK, TAXES AND OTHER REVENUE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA, A4-A6 (1982)).
118. According to one local assessor, "In the late sixties, the reappraisals that were
being done by local assessors' offices were causing increases of between 30 to 100 percent in
individual property values." PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 116, at 8 (remarks of Fresno County Assessor William G. Greenwood). Statistics presented to the United
States Senate by Senator Henry Bellmon indicate that those increases accelerated just prior
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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dramatically.""
In 1978, California voters enacted Proposition 13 by a wide margin
that swept across political and demographic lines. 2 ' The initiative added
article XIIIA to the California Constitution. The first section of the new
article limits ad valorem"'. taxes on real property to "[olne percent (1%)
of the full cash value of property."' 22
Proposition 13 specially defined the term "full cash value" to prevent
taxes from increasing due to spiraling real estate values, despite the limit
on the tax rate. The initiative defined full cash value as the assessed
value of the property in the 1975-76 tax year, "or, thereafter, the appraised value of real property when purchased, newly constructed, or a
change in ownership has occurred after the 1975 assessment.' '

23

In addi-

tion, assessors may 1adjust
full cash value each year for inflation, not to
24
exceed two percent.

This reassessment mechanism changes the property tax system from
one of a tax based on current market value to one based on acquisition
value 2' with a limited adjustment for inflation. The drafters of Proposition 13 included this provision to make tax relief meaningful by insulating property owners from taxes on the unrealized paper gains in the value
of their property. 26 Some commentators have severely criticized its effect. "' 7 Taxing property on its value at the date of acquisition sometimes
to the enactment of Proposition 13. "In the last two years, the lid has blown off. Largely due
to skyrocketing property values, Californians have been experiencing average real estate tax
hikes of 100 percent to 150 percent." 124 CONG. REc. 19708 (1978).
119. V. RAYMOND, SURVIVING PROPOSITION THIRTEEN: FIscAL CRISIS IN CALIFORNIA
COUNTIES at 1 (1988). See also PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 116, at 1
(remarks of Theodore L. Hullar).
120. Overall, Proposition 13 received a 64.8% "yes" vote. Moreover, 55 % of Democrats supported it, and 51 % of voters with college and graduate degrees voted yes. UP TO
THE LIMIT, supra note 117, at 1.
121. "[Ain ad valorem tax... is any source of revenue derived from applying a property tax rate to the assessed value of property." Heckendorn v. City of San Marino, 42 Cal.
3d 481, 483, 723 P.2d 64, 64-65, 229 Cal. Rptr. 324, 324 (1986). In other words, it is a tax
based on the value of the property.
122. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(a). This limit does not apply to taxes levied to pay for
voter-approved indebtedness. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b). For judicial interpretation of
the debt provision, see generally, Patton v. City of Alameda, 40 Cal. 3d 41, 706 P.2d 1135,
219 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985); Carman v. Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 318, 644 P.2d 192, 182 Cal. Rptr. 506
(1982); Arvin Union School Dist. v. Ross, 176 Cal. App. 3d 189, 221 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1985);
City of Watsonville v. Merrill, 137 Cal. App. 3d 185, 186 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1982); Metropolitan
Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Dorff, 98 Cal. App. 3d 109, 159 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1979); Kern County
Water Agency v. Board of Supervisors, 96 Cal. App. 3d 874, 158 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1979).
123. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(a). For a thorough discussion of valuation procedures
under Proposition 13, see 1 R. CRAWFORD III & W. THOMAS, CALIFORNIA TAXES §§ 1.56, 1.57
(2d ed. 1988).
124. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2(b).
125. Shafer v. State Bd. of Equalization, 174 Cal. App. 3d 423, 427, 220 Cal. Rptr. 59,
61 (1985).
126. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 235, 583 P.2d 1281, 1293, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 251 (1978).
127. Challenge to Prop. 13, L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, at D.V.4, col. 1 (editorial urging
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creates large disparities in the taxes due against property of similar current market values. 28 The California Supreme Court has upheld this reassessment mechanism from an equal protection challenge. 29 Other
methods might have limited increases caused by rising property values,
such as reducing rates when assessed values rise. Further reform may occur in this area. 30
Proposition 13 also contains a provision intended to prevent the circumvention of the limitation on property taxes by imposing new burdens
on property owners. 1 ' The drafters of Proposition 13 included this provision "to prevent the government from recouping its losses from decreased
property taxes by imposing or increasing other taxes" except by popular
vote.13
Proposition 13 was only one in a continuing series of initiatives attempting to bring about tax reform in California. 3 Examples of initiaa lawsuit challenging Proposition 13 on equal protection grounds); Property Tax Warning,
Sacramento Bee, Jan. 23, 1989, at B10, col. 1 (editorial urging correction of this aspect of
Proposition 13).
128. According to one report, "Since home prices have soared in most areas of California, new owners can pay as much as 10 times more in property taxes than neighbors who
have owned their homes since the mid-1970s." High Court Tax Edict May Bring Test of
Prop. 13, L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
129. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 235, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 251. A recent
decision by the United States Supreme Court struck down on equal protection grounds a
superficially similar practice by one county assessor in West Virginia. Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 633, 634 (1989). However, the assessor in West Virginia had violated West Virginia's own law, which required equal taxation based on current
market value. Id. at 638. The standard adopted by the Court indicates that California's
policy of effectively limiting tax increases by refusing to tax the unrealized paper increase in
value would suffice from an equal protection standpoint. The Court noted that, " '[i]f the
selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable
consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law.'"
Id. (quoting Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910)). See also Garret
Freightlines, Inc. v. Montana R.R. and Pub.,Serv. Comm'n., 161 Mont. 482, 499, 507 P.2d
1040, 1047 (1973). Nothing can be certain in this regard and in any event the question of
constitutionality is not the same as the question of policy. The real issue is whether this was
the best policy the drafters of Proposition 13 might have devised.
130. Aside from the basic fairness question, "[olne of the inherent problems with all
forms of taxation is that the effective prices or cost of taxed resources and goods and services become distorted and no longer reflect true 'scarcity or market value.'" BEATrIE &
YOUNG, supra note 3, at 7. The difference between the value of property in the hands of a
current owner and the same property's value in the hands of a potential buyer could distort
economic decisions.
131. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
132. Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 38 Cal. 3d 100, 105, 695 P.2d
220, 222, 211 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135 (1985). The provision has met with only partial success in
this regard. See infra text accompanying notes 160-213.
133. From 1968 to 1986, California voters considered thirteen separate initiatives for
tax reform, adopting eight of them. UP TO THE LIMIT, supra note 117, at 1. Proposition 1 of
1973 foreshadowed the general theme of Proposition 13. Sponsored by then-Governor Ronald Reagan in 1973, that measure was actually drafted by now-United States Supreme Court
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. Judge Kennedy's Comments on Issues, S.F. Chronicle, Dec.
15, 1987, at A13, col. 2.
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tives enacted to follow up on Proposition 13 include Proposition 4, which
established spending limits for state and local governments,"3 4 and Proposition 62, intended to require voter approval for all new or increased
local taxes." 5
B.

The Legislative Response to Proposition13: Loss of Local Control

The attempts by the California legislature to reallocate state and local revenues following the enactment of Proposition 13 have had severe,
and usually negative, policy implications for the relationship between
state and local governments. Other states, including Montana, that rely
excessively on the property tax as a source of local revenue, should carefully consider the results of California's legislative response before attempting to restructure their systems of local government finance. California's response resulted in a major curtailment of local control over
policies and expenditures. A concern for the ability of local governments
to provide local solutions to local problems counsels caution. Tax reform
should not result in centralization of authority in the state government.
1. Proposition 13 Implementing Legislation
The legislature's prime focus in responding to Proposition 13 has
been to channel state revenue into local government. The legislature's response has consisted primarily of three bills, Senate Bill 154,36 a package
of state aid to local governments passed immediately after Proposition 13,
Assembly Bill 8,137 passed in 1979, and "The Long Term Financing Act of
1984".'38
The legislature rushed its first bill, Senate Bill 154, into effect to beat
the July 1, 1978 effective date of Proposition 13.139 As a result, Senate
Bill 154 bears few signs of any careful consideration of the fundamental
issues involved when the state begins channeling revenue to local governments.14 For example, the bill contained a system for distributing property tax revenues among the various governmental entities within a
county in the same proportions as prevailed prior to Proposition 13.141
This system has caused residents of cities that previously imposed little
or no property tax to subsidize other cities that charged higher tax rates
prior to Proposition 13.142 The legislature also provided local governments
134.
135.

CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53720-53730 (West. Supp. 1989). The California Court of

Appeal has recently invalidated retroactive enforcement of Proposition 62. City of Westminster v. County of Orange, 204 Cal. App. 3d 623, 631, 251 Cal. Rptr. 511, 515-17 (1988).
136. 1978 Cal. Stat. 292.
137. 1979 Cal. Stat. 282.
138. 1984 Cal. Stat. 448. See also RAYMOND, supra note 119, at 8.
139.
140.

RAYMOND, supra note 119, at 8.

141.

1978 Cal. Stat. 292, §§ 24-32. This system, as amended, is codified in CAL. REV. &
§§ 97-100 (West Supp. 1989).

TAX. CODE

142.

Id.
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with funding for various programs that had previously depended upon
local government revenue.' 43 This aid, however, came with strings attached in the form of state requirements for certain local spending, including specified levels of police and fire protection, health services, and a
limitation on pay raises for local employees. 4"
Although the legislature has since enacted two long term Proposition
13 implementation bills, it has never thoroughly rethought the relationship between state and local government. 45 Both Assembly Bill 8 and
"The Long Term Financing Act of 1984" continued the policy of providing state aid to local governments and requiring local governments to
spend much of the money in ways dictated by the state. 4"
2.

Loss of Local Government Autonomy

As a result of the legislature's implementing legislation, local governments in California today enjoy substantially less autonomy from the
state government than they had previously. This change did not occur as
a direct result of Proposition 13, but rather resulted from the actions chosen by the legislature after the enactment of Proposition 13. Proposition
13 cut taxes; the legislature allocated those cuts.
By parceling out money to local governments with strings attached,
the state has increased its power over a variety of local functions. 47 The
drafters of Proposition 13 did not intend this result."4 Power and money
naturally go together in politics. In California today, "power follows the
dollar and the dollars come from Sacramento."' 4 9
The decline in local autonomy stems from the relatively low proportion of the budget that a local government actually retains the discretion
to control. Local governments cannot decide locally what programs to
fund and what policies to pursue if the state mandates how to spend the
money. For example, in a recent budget year, the Board of Supervisors of
San Diego County had discretion in the spending of only $34 million out
of a total budget of $1.2 billion. 50 Similarly, the Board of Supervisors of
Yolo County retained discretion over eighteen percent of its budget, down
13 at 3 (1985).
143. 1978 Cal. Stat. 292, § 15 (enacting Division 4, Part 1.5 of the California Government Code). Further statutes controlling state payments to local governments implementing
Proposition 13 are codified in Division 1, Part 0.5, of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code, commencing with section 50.
144. 1978 Cal. Stat. 292 § 15.
145. RAYMOND, supra note 119, at 8.
146. Id. at 10-13.
147. PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 116, at 24 (remarks of California
State Senator Marion Bergeson).
148. Id. (quoting Proposition 13 co-author Paul Gann).
149. Id. at 24-25. See also, Id. at 41 (remarks of Ruth Gadebusch, Director of the
California School Boards Association and Board President of the Fresno Unified School
District).
150. Id. at 38 (remarks of San Diego County Supervisor George Bailey).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
THE No-PROPERTY TAX CITIES AND PROPOSITION

20

Even: Of Castles and Kings: A Perspective for Property Tax Reform
PROPERTY TAX REFORM
1989]

263

from fifty percent ten years ago."' The situation in city governments is
15 2
somewhat brighter, but the problem remains.
The phenomenon of unfunded state mandates for local services further reduces the proportion of local revenues subject to local discretion.
The California Constitution states that when the legislature requires local
governments to carry out a new program or a higher level of service (a
state mandate), the legislature must provide funding for that program or
service. '53 In practice, the legislature often avoids providing this funding.
Between 1975 and 1984, nearly 2,400 bills contained mandates, but only
106 actually contained appropriations.'" Since the adoption of the constitutional provision requiring the state to pay for state mandated local programs, "most of the flagrant abuses have been eliminated.' 1 55 Yet, at least
one county is suing the state over inadequate appropriations for mandated programs. 5" The legislature has, however, provided an administrative remedy. Local governments may seek an order from the Commission
on State Mandates to the state Controller to provide state funding for a
state mandated program. 5 '
The solution to the decline of local control caused by the legislative
implementation of Proposition 13 must center around a rethinking of the
allocation of state and local revenue sources. 5 8 The problem in doing so
is that policy makers encounter two differing views toward the problem.
Some view the allocation of local revenue as a quest for the money to
finance a list of programs for which they perceive a public demand.
Others regard Proposition 13 as an attempt to make choices between pri151. Id. at 39 (remarks of Yolo County Supervisor Betsy Marchand).
152. RAYMOND, supra note 119, at 1. The effect of Proposition 13 on public schools is
less easily discerned. PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 116, at 5 (remarks of
public finance consultant Kevin Bacon). Just before the adoption of Proposition 13 the California Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds the state's system of financing education through local property taxes. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 617-18, 487 P.2d
1241, 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 624-25 (1971); Serrano V. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 774-75,
557 P.2d 929, 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 373 (1976), cert. denied, Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S.
907 (1977). California's current system of education finance therefore developed from a mix
of causes, both legal and political, including the supreme court decision, Proposition 13, and
the legislative responses to both.
153. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 6. This is one provision of Proposition 4, the government spending limit adopted by the voters in 1979.
154. RAYMOND, supra note 119, at 27. The requirement of funding for state mandates
did not become a part of the constitution until the enactment of Proposition 4 in 1979. CAL.
CONST. art. XIIIB, § 6. However, a statutory funding guarantee existed prior to that time.
RAYMOND, supra note 119, at 27.
155. RAYMOND, supra note 119, at 27.
156. Bd. of Supervisors, County of Butte v. McMahon, No. 3 Civ. C003383 (Cal. Ct.
App., 3rd App. Dist.).
157. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17615.1 (West Supp. 1989). On the subject of state mandated
local costs in general, see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 17500-17630 (West Supp. 1989); CAL. REV. &
TAX CODE §§ 2201-2327 (West 1989).
158. PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 116, at 48 (remarks of Craig Stubblebine, Professor of Economics, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1989

21

Montana Law Review, Vol. 50 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 4

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

'
vate and public spending, and are therefore reluctant to raise taxes. 59

C. Judicial Interpretationof Proposition 13
Proposition 13 has generated an enormous amount of litigation. California's appellate courts have rendered at least sixty-five published decisions construing various aspects of Proposition 13."60 This section will analyze the more significant decisions dealing with non-ad valorem taxes
and fees.
While the primary effect of Proposition 13 was to place a one percent
limit on ad valorem property taxes, the initiative also sought to control
the ways in which additional government revenue would be raised. Section four of Proposition 13 provides:
Cities, Counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district,
except ad valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax
on the sale of real property within such City, County or special
district. 6 '
California's experience offers an example of the failure to plan for the
consequences of a tax reduction. Governments faced with a significant
loss of revenue from one source will naturally look for other sources.'
The ambiguity of section four has caused the courts, and not the voters or
legislature, to determine major policy questions.
The major issue under section four of Proposition 13 concerns the
definition of the term "special tax." When a taxing entity seeks to adopt
a new revenue-raising device, the tension under Proposition 13 lies in the
issue of whether that device constitutes a special tax. This relates to the
basic policy question of the form and extent of new revenue sources that
should be allowed as a part of an effort to reform the burdens of the
property tax system.
The California Supreme Court explained the way in which section
four relates to the general tax limitation purpose of Proposition 13.
"[Slince any tax savings resulting from the operation of sections 116' and
2'" could be withdrawn or depleted by additional or increased state or
159. Id. at 47-48.
160. See Annotations to CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (West Supp. 1989).
161. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4.
162. Since Proposition 13 limited local governments' use of the property tax, at least
117 cities have raised more than 156 taxes. CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS' ASSOCIATION, Proposition
62, Local Tax Increases:Should Voters Have a Say?, CAL-TAx NEWS, August 15, 1986, at 3.
The predominant forms of new taxes have been utility-user taxes, business-license taxes,

and transient-occupancy taxes. Id.
163. Section 1 provides for a one-percent limit on the tax rate. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA,

§ 1.
164.

Section 2 sets forth the reassessment limitations. Assessments may increase when

property is transferred or newly constructed and by up to two percent annually for inflation.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA § 2.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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local levies of other than property taxes, sections 3168 and 4 combine to
'
place restrictions upon the imposition of such taxes." 166
Given this purpose of section four, the litigants in City and County
of San Francisco v. Farrell""called upon the court to determine what
taxes would constitute special taxes. Farrell involved an increase by the
City and County of San Francisco in its payroll or gross receipts tax on
businesses.' 68 The board of supervisors placed the tax increase on the ballot, and received the support of fifty-five percent of the voters. 16 9 Farrell,
the city's controller, refused to certify that the additional revenues raised
through the tax increase were available for spending, arguing that the increase was invalid for lack of approval by a two-thirds vote of the electorate as required by section four.1 70 The city responded by filing an original action in the California Supreme Court to resolve the dispute.'
Farrell argued that the term "special taxes" referred to any "extra,
additional, or supplemental charge imposed ...to raise money for public
purposes."'7 2 He contended that the purpose of section four, to prevent
circumvention
of the property
tax
limit,
necessitated this
interpretation. 171
The court disagreed, noting the ambiguity of the drafting of section
four. 174 California law had used the term "special taxes" to mean different
things in different contexts.7 5 The court determined that in the context
of Proposition 13, special taxes should mean "taxes which are levied for a
specific purpose rather than . . .a levy placed in the general fund to be
utilized for general governmental purposes."' 76 The court based this conclusion partly on a desire to reduce the scope of the two-thirds vote re7
quirement, which the court disfavored on policy grounds.
Justice Kaus contended in his dissent, "If section 4 was indeed intended to restrict the ability of local entities to replace the property tax
losses mandated by Proposition 13, then the interpretation of 'special
taxes' adopted by the court is clearly off the mark.' 78 Justice Richard165. Section 3 requires a two-thirds vote of members of the legislature for any increase
in state taxes. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3.
166. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 231, 583 P.2d 1281, 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249 (1978) (footnotes added).
167. 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982).
168. Id. at 51, 648 P.2d at 936, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
169. Id. at 51, 648 P.2d at 937, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 54, 648 P.2d at 938, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
173. Id. at 56, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (citing Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 231,
583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49).
174. Id. at 53, 648 P.2d at 938, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 57, 648 P.2d at 940, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
177. Id. at 52, 648 P.2d at 937-38, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The court had earlier sustained the two-thirds vote requirement on a constitutional challenge in Amador, 22 Cal. 3d
at 237, 583 P.2d at 1294-95, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
178. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 58, 648 P.2d at 941, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 719 (Kaus, J.,
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son, also dissenting, added that the decision allows local governments to
replace the general revenue decline from property taxes with other general revenues free of any restriction from Proposition 13.1' 9 The dissenting justices could not reconcile the majority's view with the overall tax
reform system of Proposition 13 when viewed in light of the purpose of
section four.8 0
From the perspective of other states considering property tax reform,
it does not really matter whether the majority or the dissenters were correct in Farrell. Either way, the case stands as a reminder to drafters of
tax reform proposals to avoid ambiguity. The dispute resolved in Farrell
came about only because the drafters of Proposition 13 failed to define
the terms they used.
After Farrell, one issue regarding new revenue measures is clear. If a
tax is a special tax, levied for a particular purpose, the two-thirds vote
requirement of section four will apply; if a tax is a general tax, collected
for general revenue purposes, section four does not regulate its adoption.
Most published decisions, however, concern an entirely different issue:
whether the revenue measure is a "tax" at all.
The latter issue first arose in County of Fresno v. Malmstrom,"8 ' regarding a special assessment Fresno County levied on property in a subdivision to construct improvements. The county tax collector refused to
collect the money, arguing that the assessment constituted a special tax,
and therefore required a two-thirds vote. 8 '
Noting the ambiguous drafting of Proposition 13,183 the California
Court of Appeal drew a distinction between taxes and special assessments. "Taxes are raised for the general revenue of the governmental entity to pay [for] a variety of public services .... A special assessment is
charged to real property to pay for benefits that property has received
from a local improvement and, strictly speaking, is not a tax at all." '84
Rather than being a general revenue source, special assessments are "used
to confer special benefit upon the parcels charged for the improvements.
"..,185
The improvements to which the court referred included construction of "streets, sewers, sidewalks, water systems, lighting and public utility lines."' 86 The court held that Proposition 13, as a measure reforming
the system of ad valorem property taxes, does not regulate special assessments because they are not taxes.'
dissenting).
179. Id. (Richardson, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1979).
182. Id. at 977-78, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
183. Id. at 978-79, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
184. Id. at 983-84, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782-83 (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 983, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
186. Id. at 978, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
187. Id. at 980-82, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 780-82. As another court of appeal panel phrased
it, "Special assessments, being levied only for improvements that benefit particular parcels
of land, and not to raise general revenues, are simply not the type of exaction that can be
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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Therefore, a revenue device properly classified as a special assessment is not a tax and the section four requirement of a two-thirds vote
will not apply. The key to defining a special assessment is the special
benefit to certain property."'8
The subsequent Court of Appeal decision in Solvang Municipal Improvement District v. Board of Supervisors " expanded on this concept.
While adopting the reasoning of Malmstrom,90 the court observed that,
"[iun practical application, the two types of taxation, general ad valorem
taxes and special assessments, to some extent overlap, and we cannot always differentiate between them with precision." 9 ' The court listed as
examples of traditional, appropriate special assessments "street improvement, lighting improvement, irrigation improvement, sewer connection,
drainage improvement, or flood control improvement."' 9'2 By contrast, levies to support fire and police protection, "and for general improvements,
such as fire stations, police stations, and public buildings, which are
deemed to benefit all property owners" would constitute taxes. 9
The subtle distinction thus lies between special taxes on the one
hand, which benefit the community generally and are subject to section
four of Proposition 13, and special assessments on the other, which benefit specific property. Sensing that governments might try to use this subtlety to enact a traditional tax in the guise of a special assessment and
thereby avoid Proposition 13, the court warned:
We add a word of caution to taxing entities which might be tempted to
use the special assessment exclusion as a means to circumvent the tax
limitation of Article XIIIA. Our opinion excluding special assessments..
. from the one percent limitation of section 1 applies only to true special
assessments designed to directly benefit the real property assessed and
make it more valuable. Ordinarily, levies to meet general expenses of the
taxing entity and to construct facilities to serve the general public, such
as fire stations, police stations, and schools, may not be transformed
from general ad valorem taxes to special assessments by a mere change
in the name of the levy.'"
Despite this cautionary note by the Solvang court, local governments
have increasingly used special assessments to finance public improvements that tax revenues would probably have funded in years past. Between 1978 and 1980, use of special assessments increased by 175 percent. 9' 5 For example, in City of San Diego v. Holodnak,'" the Court of
used as a mechanism for circumventing these tax relief provisions." County of Placer v.
Corin, 113 Cal. App. 3d 443, 454, 170 Cal. Rptr. 232, 239 (1980).
188. Malmstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
189. 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1980).
190. Id. at 554-55, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
191. Id. at 553, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
192. Id. at 552, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 557, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 398 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
note 117,1989
at 797 (citing ANNUAL REPORTs OF THE25
195. Special Assessments,
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Appeal allowed the City of San Diego to finance the construction of a
public library branch, a park and ride facility, and a fire station through a
special assessment. 9 " The Solvang court specifically listed fire stations as
facilities of general benefit and therefore not an appropriate object for
special assessment financing.1 98
A variation on the special assessment theme has emerged in the increased use of development fees. 19" The basic idea behind development
fees is that developers should pay to upgrade public facilities affected by
new construction. 00 California courts have approved these fees to pay for
increased transportation needs caused by new office space20 ' and for
schools necessitated by development of new subdivisions. 0 2 California
(1980)).
196. 157 Cal. App. 3d 759, 203 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1984).
197. Id. at 762, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
198. Solvang, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 557, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 398. A conflict of this type
between Court of Appeal decisions can arise because the California Court of Appeal consists
of six separate courts for different geographical districts, each composed of one or more
divisions. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 69100-69106 (West. Supp. 1989). Cases are assigned to threejudge panels within those divisions. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
199. The increased use of development fees is documented in R. HECKART & T. DEAN,
PROPOSITION 13 IN THE 1978 CALIFORNIA PRIMARY: A POST-ELECTION BIBLIOGRAPHY 90-91
(1981).
200. See Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 325, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 685, 689 (1981). That court reasoned that, "the developer has created a new, and
cumulatively overwhelming, burden on local government facilities, and therefore he should
offset the additional responsibilities required of the public agency by the dedication of land,
construction of improvements, or payment of fees, all needed to provide improvements and
services required by the new development." Id. at 325, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90 (quoting
STATE CONTROLLER, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING SPECIAL DISTRICTS

LONGTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND USE REGULATIONS

at 617 (1977)).

201. Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco, 199 Cal. App. 3d
1496, 1516, 246 Cal. Rptr. 21, 22 (1987). The California Supreme Court reviewed some aspects of the Russ Bldg. case, approving the retroactive application of the development fees
to buildings under construction at the time the fee was instituted. Russ Bldg. Partnership v.
City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839, 854, 750 P.2d 324, 332-33, 244 Cal. Rptr.
682, 691 (1988). However, the court let stand the decision of the court of appeal as to the
constitutionality under Proposition 13 of the fee itself. Id. at 845, 750 P.2d at 326, 244 Cal.
Rptr. at 685.
202. Trent Meredith, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 327-28, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 691. Schools provide one of the clearest examples of a local service traditionally funded through taxes, rather
than through assessments. The court based its reasoning largely on the notion that a property owner has no right to a building permit and therefore the government can attach
whatever conditions it wants to the issuance of that permit. Id. at 325-28, 170 Cal. Rptr. at
689-91. The United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected this argument, stating,
"[tihe right to build on one's own property ... cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.'" Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3146 n.2 (1987).
The Court further held that, under the "takings" clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the only conditions that government can attach to a building
permit are those that would mitigate some impact of the development that would itself
justify denial of the permit. Id. at 3147-48. For an excellent analysis of the Nollan decision,

see generally, Bittle, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: You Can't Always Get
What You Want, But Sometimes You Get What You Need, 15 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 345
(1988).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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statutes authorize the imposition of development fees for any purpose,"0 3
provided that the local government can prove that the development project creates the need for the public facility the fees would finance.2""
Many local governments may find the prospect of financing public
facilities through developer fees enticing, but should first consider the
public policy implications of doing so. The government bears the burden
of proving that the development project created the need for the facilities
so financed.2 05 These fees increase building costs, and therefore discourage development and increase housing costs. 0 Charges to the users of a
service, in a non-governmental context, are simply called prices.2 0 7 Developer fees may also entail other social costs, such as the inequity that
arises if a few must pay for the facilities used by all. Legislatures should
not make developer fees available to local governments simply as an alternative to the property tax without careful consideration of the types of
programs to finance in this way.
Of late, California jurisdictions have begun attempts to raise revenue
by assessing an annual fixed tax on every parcel of real estate.20 8 Known
as "parcel taxes," these taxes do not vary according to the value of the
property.2 09 Local governments find them appealing because, as non-ad
valorem taxes, the one-percent limit of section one of Proposition 13 does
not apply. Also, when levied for general revenue purposes, they do not
require a two-thirds vote under section four of Proposition 13.210 However, the attractiveness of parcel taxes to taxing entities results more
from their perceived availability following Proposition 13's limitation on
the ad valorem property tax, than on careful policy choices. It is difficult
to imagine anyone favoring the reduction of ad valorem property taxes to
replace them with flat fees on every parcel regardless of worth. The parcel
tax places a proportionately greater burden on the owners of less valuable
properties than on owners of more valuable properties.2 "' The California
Court of Appeal disapproved one such tax as a violation of the California
Constitutional requirement that all property taxes must be ad valorem." 2
Some taxing authorities have, however, continued to attempt to impose
203.
204.
205.
227, 235,

206.

CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66000-66009 (West Supp. 1989).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66001(a)(4) (West Supp. 1989).
Beaumont Investors v. Beaumont-Cherry Valley Water Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d
211 Cal. Rptr. 567, 571 (1985).
HECKART

& DEAN, supra note 199, at 90-91.

207. PROPOSITON 13, TEN YEARS LATER, supra note 116, at 13 (remarks of W. Douglas
Morgan, Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara).
208. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Digre, 205 Cal. App. 3d 99, 252 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1988).
209. Id. at 103, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
210. Id. at 104, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
211. In Digre, the City of Oakland, in fact, argued that its tax was an excise tax on
"the use and enjoyment of municipal services [as] a necessary incident of urban property
ownership which may be taxed without taxing ownership per se." Id. at 107, 252 Cal. Rptr.
at 103. The court rejected this argument, calling it a mere post hoc justification. Id.
Id. at 109, at
252University
Cal. Rptr. of
at Montana,
101 (citing 1989
CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1).
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such taxes.2 1
Review of judicial interpretation of Proposition 13 reveals that property tax reformers failed to anticipate how ambiguities or omissions in the
initiative might help defeat its purpose. Designers of a tax reform system
must predict its consequences, and formulate clear policies as to whether
and how to raise revenue. Policy makers should thoughtfully consider
these decisions as part of an overall design of an equitable revenue system. The methods governments use to raise revenue should reflect sound
policy choices, and should not amount simply to any opportunity remaining after the reform of the property tax.
IV. A

PERSPECTIVE FOR TAX REFORM IN MONTANA

California's experience demonstrates that tax reform is like squeezing
a balloon: when reformers squeeze one part of the balloon by reducing a
particular tax burden, natural forces of governmental expansion tend to
create a bulge in the balloon somewhere else. The challenge for property
tax reformers is to decide how far the balloon should expand, and the
areas in which that expansion should occur. That means crafting careful
policies regarding total revenue levels, 14 the preferred means of raising
those revenues,21 5 and the relationship between state and local govern213. For example, a California statute grants school districts authority to levy parcel
taxes. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50079 (West. Supp. 1989). For an example of such a tax, see San
Juan Tax Plan Opposed, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 27, 1989, at B1, col. 4 (referring to a parcel
tax proposed by the San Juan Unified School District in Sacramento County). The San
Juan proposal, presented to the district's voters for approval on March 7, 1989, illustrates
one problem with "ballot box budgeting." The district's presentation of the question on the
ballot asked voters whether they would support a parcel tax to pay for various specific programs such as special education, reading, school libraries, and drug and alcohol abuse prevention. San Juan Unified School Dist. Res. No. 1546 (1988). However, the district adopted
a contingency plan for budget cuts in case the voters rejected the tax. That plan contemplated cuts differed substantially from programs voters were asked to finance. San Juan
Swings Ax at Budget, Sacramento Bee, Feb. 8, 1989, at B1, col. 5. Under ballot box budgeting, taxing entities can list their most popular programs on ballots in the hope of enticing
voter support, rather than setting forth their actual priorities.
214. A limitation on property taxes to one percent of market value, similar to Proposition 13, would provide tax savings of between $47 million and $81 million annually, depending on how broadly that limit was applied to the various property classifications. Fiscal note
to S.B. 158, at 1 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989).
215. Montana has a long history of structuring its taxation system in ways that profoundly affect economic decision making. In the early part of this century, Montana's revenue structure shifted the burden of taxation onto individuals and farmers and away from
"the Company." K. TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND 221 (1959) (citing L. LEVINE, THE
TAXATION OF MINES IN MONTANA (1920)). Beattie and Young have suggested that today the
pendulum may have swung too far in the other direction, with the state opting for a "soak it
to the rich and the corporations" philosophy. BEATTIE & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 25. Perfect
balance in the tax system must prove elusive because the more the system seeks to avoid
one kind of error, such as giving big business a free ride, the more it risks another kind of
error, such as discouraging business activity. See Radford, Statistical Error and Legal Error, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 843, 851 (1988). At the very least, Montana's plethora of property
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
tax classifications and tax rates, see supra note 34, must affect economic decision making.
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ments. Policy, and not availability, should control the selection of revenue
sources.
This article does not propose which specific taxes or other funding
sources policy makers should prefer when shifting tax burdens away from
property taxpayers. Resolution of Montana's ongoing debates over a sales
tax, the income tax surcharge, and severance taxes, to name but a few, lie
well beyond the scope of this article. Rather, this article suggests ways of
making alternative tax choices effective.
These suggestions begin with the observation that the recent Montana Supreme Court decision invalidating Montana's system of education
finance affords an opportunity for a thorough review of the state's revenue structure. Succeeding sections demonstrate that once this review
commences, legislators might choose one of two general approaches to reform, or a combination, with differing consequences. The legislature could
grant local governments a share of state revenue, collecting any additional
revenue at the state level. Alternatively, the state could authorize local
governments to impose various new local revenue sources.
A.

School Financing

The urgent necessity of restructuring the state's education finance
system affords an opportunity for comprehensive review of the state's
revenue structure. The legislature could find ways of channeling statewide
non-property tax revenue into the educational system, providing property
tax relief, and thereby incorporating the reform of education finance into
the larger reform of the state's system of taxation." 6 Some proposals
before the 1989 Montana Legislature instead advocated raising statewide
property taxes to pay for equalization of education funding.2" 7 This approach would solve the immediate problem for the schools, but would igTaxing different activities (in this case, assets) at different rates is tantamount to
subsidizing one activity at the expense of another, which impacts resource allocation and ultimately lowers our standard of living ....

Clearly our differential

property tax system alters the relative costs of holding and using different kinds
of property, which typically encourages inefficient and inappropriate production
and consumption choices.
BEATrIE & YOUNG, supra note 3, at 25.

216. For example, during the 1989 regular session, Governor Stephens stressed the
need for a permanent new source of school revenue and vowed to use his veto power to
prevent increasing the burden of existing taxes. Special Session Looms, Missoulian, April
18, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Montana's sales tax controversy complicates this approach, with support for increasing property tax burdens resulting largely from opposition to the sales tax.
As Representative Mike Kadas stated, "I know this is part of the whole sales tax game and I
think we all know that." Missoulian, April 11, 1989, at C-1, col. 2. This article should not be
construed as taking any position on the sales tax issue.
217. A proposal by Representative Mike Kadas would have increased the statewide
mill levies for schools from 45 mills to 160 mills. H.B. 575, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1989). Kadas acknowledged that this proposal would have increased property taxes for
about half of the state's taxpayers. Capitol Chronicle, Missoulian, Feb. 12, 1989, at 12, col.
3. Presumably the other half would not have received increases because the proposal might
have
made some local
permissive of
and
voted levies
unnecessary.
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nore an opportunity to address overall revenue problems and might even
increase the burden on property taxpayers.21
Recently, the Montana Supreme Court in Helena Elementary School
Dist. No. 1 v. State,21 mandated that the state's education system must
provide equal opportunity to children throughout the state.22 What this
means in terms of precise levels of funding, including both state and local
sources, remains unclear. A constitutional mandate for a particular level
of funding is difficult to discern from the language of the constitution
which provides, "It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of each person.
Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the
state."2 2 The first sentence, dealing with developing each person's full
educational potential, states a goal, not a duty of the state. The second
sentence relates only to equality of opportunity, not a level of
opportunity.
The court implied that the inclusion in the constitution of an aspirational goal differs from language guaranteeing a right.222 This decision did
not determine what duty the state may have to pursue the goal expressed
in the constitution. In an earlier decision, the court noted, "The legislature is obligated to provide a basic system of free quality education."2 It
therefore appears that the legislature must equalize educational opportunity throughout the state, as well as provide a public school system that
meets some imprecise basic level of quality.
Several passages from the court's decision may suggest to some that
merely distributing current revenues equally statewide may not provide
sufficient funding. Such a conclusion may read more into the court's decision than the holding actually merits. While the court rejected the idea
that sufficient funding to meet minimum accreditation standards would
suffice 2 and criticized the state's failure to adequately fund its statewide
foundation program, 22 5 increased state funding for poorer districts might
make some local property tax levies unnecessary. The decision therefore
does not indicate whether the constitution mandates a higher total level
of funding for education, including both state and local revenue. Because
the framers of the constitution chose to express their only reference to
218. Anticipating the rejection of H.B. 575 by a select committee, House Daily Status
Report, April 24, 1989, at 36, Representative Kadas moved to amend a competing bill, S.B.
203, 51st. Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989), to increase by 25 mills the statewide property tax
levy proposed in that bill. Missoulian, April 11, 1989, at C-1, col. 2 (profiling Representative
Kadas).
219.
220.

221.

Mont. -,
769 P.2d 684 (1989).
Id. at -, 769 P.2d at 690.
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1.

222.

Helena School Dist., - Mont. at

-

-,

769 P.2d at 689.

State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees, - Mont ....
804 (1986) (citing MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1).
224. Helena School Dist., Mont. at __, 769 P.2d at 691.
223.

225. Id. at -, 769 P.2d at 690.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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level of educational opportunity as an aspirational goal,22 the legislature
must have broad discretion to decide what level of funding adequately
advances that goal. To conclude otherwise would seriously jeopardize the
separation of powers by enmeshing the courts too deeply in the budget
and taxation process. 2 7
The supreme court's decision also leaves unanswered an intriguing
question regarding the future availability of local voted school levies. The
decision's entire theme revolves around the principle of equal educational
opportunity.22 8 The court based its conclusion partly on the "excessive
reliance on ...voted levies ....-229The decision must therefore call into
question the ability of wealthy districts to impose additional taxes upon
themselves to augment local educational programs. A system allowing this
option may perpetuate the disparities between rich and poor districts.
The availability of local voted levies might even encourage relatively
low statewide education budgets. This largely speculative concern stems
from the assumption that the state's budget in the current economic climate very nearly resembles a zero-sum game in which the appropriation
of more money for one purpose necessarily means that less must be appropriated for some other. Legislators might be inclined to appropriate
scarce state dollars to other high priority purposes 230 if local communities
which wish to do so may supplement their school district budgets with
locally voted levies. This might work to the detriment of children in
poorer communities whose parents lack the realistic option of matching
other communities' voted levies. On the other hand, the tight state
budget might suggest a greater need to find ways for communities, or
even individual parents, who want to provide greater opportunities for
their children to have a vehicle for doing so. While the option for local
communities to supplement the educational opportunities of their children through local voted levies holds much attraction, its exercise may
conflict with the constitution's dictate of equal educational opportunity
for all.
Resolution of the many issues involved in restructuring education finance offers an unparalleled opportunity to review Montana's entire reve226. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1 (first sentence).
227. See Comment, Butte Community Union v. Lewis: A New Constitutional Standard for Evaluating General Assistance Legislation, 48 MONT. L. REV. 163, 176 (1987) (authored by Scott C. Wurster). Even if the current total level of funding satisfies the constitution, overall increases may occur if the legislature, and ultimately the public, reject
budgetary reductions for the wealthier districts.
228. Helena School Dist., Mont. at -, 769 P.2d at 690.
229. Id.
230. In 1988, California voters adopted an initiative measure designed to guarantee
public schools a minimum percentage of the state's general fund budget. Proposition 98, § 5,
reprintedin CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, at 79 (1988) (amending CAL.
CONST. art. XVI, § 8). While the goal of seeking adequate funding for education is laudable,
the removal of California's elected officials from the establishment of priorities for the
spending of public money must cause concern.
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nue structure. 31 The legislature should not overlook this occasion to reform Montana's system of taxation.
B. Providing State Revenue for Local Governments
Two major concerns would result from a decision to replace local
property taxes with state revenue. First, the legislature should structure
its reform to preserve local control over local decision-making. Second,
the reform should insure that new statewide revenue sources do not cause
overall tax burdens to increase, unless such an increase results from a
conscious policy choice.
As discussed previously, California has experienced a decline in local
autonomy as a result of local government's dependence upon the state for
revenues.2 2 Montana should prevent this development by requiring that
any state assistance to local governments come in the form of block
grants. State requirements for the spending of local budgets lead to a loss
of local control.
As a counterpart to providing local assistance in the form of block
grants, Montana should study the effectiveness of its statutes requiring
the state to pay for services it mandates local governments to provide.2 3
Local governments consistently complain that the legislature requires lo"
calities to provide certain services, but does not provide funding.
Should a legislative study prove this point, California's experience suggests that enacting a constitutional provision requiring state funding of
mandated local programs may improve the situation.2 5
If the legislature decides to provide assistance to local governments
through funds collected at the state level, it will have to determine on a
policy basis what sources to use in collecting that revenue. To the extent
231. The legislature should use the opportunity of school finance reform to review the
basic premises underlying the property tax system. For example, property taxes bear little
relation to ability to pay or to burdens placed on public services. BEATTIE & YOUNG, supra
note 3, at 7. The current practice of assessing property based on its highest and best use,
rather than current use, exacerbates this problem. See supra text accompanying notes 3031. The legislature should consider assessing property based only on current use, rather than
taxing the unrealized potential for the property to produce greater wealth for its owner.
Such a change would reflect a shift from viewing the property tax as purely a tax on wealth,
often as a paper or hypothetical concept, to a tax more closely related to ability to pay.
The economic effects of such a change in policy would require study. Taxation based
only on current use may provide greater relief to development interests than to ordinary
home owners because studies might (or might not) determine that most property not currently utilized at its highest and best use is held for development or investment purposes. It
might also marginally affect the pace at which development takes place.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 147-59.
233. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-112 (1987) (local governments); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2113 (1987) (school districts).
234. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 21 at 234. This pattern continued in the 1989 regular
session of the legislature, which rejected a bill which would have dramatically increased the
taxing authority of local governments. H.B. 479, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/4
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that such sources may entail creating new taxes," 6 the concern arises that
proliferation of the number of taxes may ultimately lead to higher overall
tax burdens. While the legislature may create new taxes for the sole purpose of decreasing property taxes, resulting in a more equitable tax system, nothing would prevent future increases in those taxes. The taxpayer
could lose in the long run if a proliferation of taxes results not in tax
reform but in a larger number of taxes with the potential for future
increases.
In order to alleviate that problem, and simultaneously to make creation of a new revenue source more politically palatable, the legislature
and voters might consider a constitutional amendment limiting the imposition of new taxes to the amount necessitated by property tax reductions. The amendment could do this by limiting the amount collected
from a new tax, dollar for dollar, to the amount of revenue forgone
through property tax reductions. Such an amendment could either limit
taxes from a particular source, such as a sales tax or income tax increase,
or more broadly limit all tax increases. To account for the legitimate governmental needs for increases in revenue over time, the constitutional
amendment could index taxes to such factors as population growth, cost
of living, economic growth, or other factors.2" The amendment could link
tax increases to tax reform as broadly or as narrowly as desired.
Alternatively, the legislature could authorize additional revenue
sources, but require voter approval for new taxes or tax increases. 3 8 This
approach differs from a limit on tax increases by accepting the possibility
of significant tax increases, but providing voters with control over those
increases.
C. Local Revenue Sources and Property Tax Reform
Authorization of new local revenue sources may accompany property
tax reductions so that property tax reform becomes meaningful. Such a
236. For example, a bill rejected by the 1989 Legislature would have placed a three
percent sales tax before the voters. S.B. 456, 51st Mont. Leg. Reg. Sess., § 135 (1989). The
bill also proposed a slight cut in property tax revenue, Id. at § 100, an allocation of sales tax
revenue to make up for that decrease, Id. at § 73, and an increase in state education funding, Id. The fiscal note to S.B. 456, however, indicated that the bill would reduce property
taxes by only 2.9% in fiscal year 1991. Fiscal note to S.B. 456, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess., at
2 (1989).
237. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 1, may provide a model for such an indexing formula. It
allows California's state spending limit to increase annually to reflect- growth in population
and in the cost of living. The precise formulation of such a system would require careful
economic analysis.
238. A proposed constitutional amendment rejected by the 1989 Montana Legislature
promoted this approach. The amendment would have required voter approval for a new or
increased sales tax, both at the state and local levels, required legislative authorization for a
local sales tax, and allowed the voters to reduce or abolish state or local sales taxes by
initiative or referendum. H.B. 269, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989). A failed sales tax bill
would also have required voter approval for its enactment or any subsequent increase. S.B.
456, 51st Mont. Leg., Reg. Sess., §§ 134, 135 (1989).
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solution would not impinge upon local autonomy, because local governments would lose discretionary income only to the extent that tax reform
would accomplish a net tax decrease.
This approach to tax reform should take into account the desired
amount of local government revenue and the preferred sources for that
revenue. Under current Montana law, counties may impose only those
taxes specifically authorized by statute.13 9 Municipalities also require specific statutory authorization to levy a tax,240 but may freely impose special
assessments "reasonably related to the cost of any special service or special benefit provided by the municipality [or they may] impose a fee for
the provision of a service." '' Local governments with self-government
charters are not subject to statutory mill levy limits, ' and may impose
any tax they choose except for a local income tax or sales tax. 42
To be effective, a plan for property tax reform preserving local autonomy should not result in greater increases in other taxes than desired.
The legislature could address this concern in either of two ways. First, the
legislature could simply authorize greater discretion to localities without
self-government charters in imposing taxes. This authorization would allow each local government to choose the revenue source it prefers and the
amount of revenue to be raised. This approach would entrust each locality with its own policy choices as to the extent and source of new revenue,
but would provide no statewide guarantee that total tax burdens would
not increase. A variation on this approach might require voter approval
for some or all new or increased taxes.
A second approach would entail policy determinations by the legislature as to the varieties and levels of local taxes. The legislature could
authorize local governments to levy only specific taxes, and could limit
the amount of those taxes. Such a policy should also address the issue of
self-governing localities. The legislature could decide to allow greater discretion to localities with self-government charters, as under the first approach, but specify the type and size of new taxes in other localities. Alternatively, the legislature could apply statewide policies to all
localities. 244 The legislature has traditionally declined to provide local
governments, other than self-governing localities, with broad authorizations to raise revenue, preferring to keep such policies tightly controlled
24 5
by state government.
Policy makers should examine Montana's special assessment laws
with a view toward assuring that they do not provide an avenue for the
circumvention of property tax reform. Montana law currently authorizes
§
§
§

239.
240.
241.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

242.
243.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-114(I)(g) (1987).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-112(1) (1987).

7-1-2103(5) (1987).
7-1-4123(5) (1987).
7-1-4123(7) (1987).

244. The Montana Constitution provides that self-governing localities "may exercise
any power not prohibited by this constitution, law, or charter." MONT. CONsT. art. XI, § 6.
245. WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 21, at 234.
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special assessments for specific purposes through the creation of special
districts." ' Municipalities, whether self-governing or not, may also impose assessments or fees wherever they can establish a reasonable relation
24 7
between the assessment or fee and some government service or benefit.
Such broad authorizations might undermine the goals of property tax reform by encouraging the use of special assessments to evade property tax
limits.
Like California, Montana law recognizes a distinction between taxes
and assessments. As the Montana Supreme Court explained, "A tax is
levied for the general public good ....An assessment is imposed against
specific property to defray the cost of a specific benefit to that property,
the benefit to be commensurate with the assessment. 24 8s The legislature
should consider restricting such assessments to appropriate purposes.
Creative minds might envision specific benefits to property from a variety
of services traditionally funded through taxes. These services might include police and fire protection, 249 ambulance service,2 5 0 libraries,25 ' and
even television facilities.2 5 2 Policy makers need to face the policy choice of
whether to allow financing of such services through assessments, outside
of any limitations on taxes, or whether to limit special assessments to the
traditional uses of constructing such public improvements as lighting,
sewers, sidewalks, and streets.
The Montana legislature should thoroughly consider all ramifications
of property tax reform. Property tax cuts may render necessary additional sources of local revenue. Policy, and not mere availability, must
dictate choices for sources of revenue. Finally, the public should not face
greater tax burdens than informed public policy dictates.
V.

CONCLUSION

Montana imposes one of the heaviest burdens in the nation on its
property taxpayers, even though that tax may bear little relation to ability to pay. Montana voters have made clear their demand that property
taxes be lowered and that the legislature take appropriate actions to insure the funding of essential local services following that reduction. The
246. Montana's special assessment statutes regarding improvement districts are codified in Chapter 12 of Title 7 of the Montana Code Annotated (1987).
247. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-4123(7) (1987).
248. Vail v. Custer County, 132 Mont. 205, 217, 315 P.2d 993, 1000 (1957). See also,
Stevens v. City of Missoula, 205 Mont. 274, 280, 667 P.2d 440, 444 (1983); Crutchfield v.
Nash, 84 Mont. 556, 564, 276 P. 938, 941 (1929); Power v. City of Helena, 43 Mont. 336, 341,
116 P. 415, 416 (1911).
249. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 25210.4(a), (b) (West Supp. 1989). But see Special Assessments, supra note 117, at 806-14 (concluding that assessments for police and fire services
are special taxes, and not special assessments, within the meaning of Proposition 13, and
therefore require a two-thirds vote for implementation).
250. See CAL.Gov'T CODE § 25210.4a(8) (West Supp. 1989).
251. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 25210.4(e) (West Supp. 1989).
252. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 25210.4(0 (West 1988).
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Montana Legislature should respond to this call by reducing property
taxes.
At the same time, Montana can profit from California's experience
with tax reform and heed its lessons on how to make tax reform effective.
A tax reform effort must predict adequately the consequences of that reform. The legislature should set policies as to the extent of new revenue
needed and the preferred methods of raising that revenue. The menu of
tax options available to government should allow for a balance of revenue
sources. Montana's tax system should not permit excessive taxation; nor
should it force reliance on a single revenue source simply because government lacks other options.
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